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During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
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practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
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Abstract 
Capability-based acquisition has led to the simultaneous development of systems 
that must eventually interact within a system-of-systems (or major sub-systems that 
must integrate on a single platform).  The necessary interdependencies between 
systems also generate complexity and can increase development risk. Trades 
between capability and risk are essential during analysis of alternatives in pre-
acquisition phases. For example, while legacy assets can potentially provide a 
certain level of capability with relatively low risk, their eventual capability may be 
restricted because of some specific characteristic or inherent rigidity.  These features 
create a trade-off space between development risk and capability potential of a 
system.  Existing tools for such trades can be cumbersome and non-intuitive when 
complexity is high.  The authors’ prior work has developed a Computational 
Exploratory Model to simulate the development process dynamics for these complex 
networks of systems intended for a system-of-systems capability.  The progress 
documented in this paper couples the computational model with a capability module 
applied to the Airborne Laser (ABL) system and presents an exemplary analysis of 
alternatives by comparing expected development time and capability level under 
certain probabilities of disruption. 
Introduction 
The purpose of capabilities-based acquisition, as described by Charles and Turner 
(2004), is to acquire a set of capabilities instead of acquiring a family of threat-based, 
service-specific systems.  The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), for example, uses capability-
based acquisition to evaluate the success of a program based on its ability to provide a new 
capability for a given cost, and not on its ability to meet specific performance requirements 
(Spacy, 2004).  The Joint Mission Capability Package (JMCP) concept is another example 
that aims to create a joint interdependency between systems to combine capabilities in 
order to maximize reinforcing effects and minimize vulnerabilities (Durkac, 2005).  The goal 
is a more efficient utilization of both human and machine-based assets and, in turn, 
improved combat power.  In these settings, systems are increasingly required to 
interoperate along several dimensions, which characterizes them as systems-of-systems 
(SoS; Maier, 1998).  SoS most often consist of multiple, heterogeneous, distributed systems 
that can (and do) operate independently but can also assemble in networks and collaborate 
to achieve a goal. 
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The presence of interdependencies in layered networks spanning a hierarchy of 
levels is one of the sources of complexity in SoS development (DeLaurentis et al., 2008a, 
2008b; Ayyalasomayajula et al., 2008; Kotegawa et al., 2008). The interdependencies 
between component systems often result in complex networks that exhibit vulnerabilities to 
disruptions in the development of even one system, especially if that one system places a 
central role in the network.  Gell-Mann (2002) defines complexity as the amount of 
information necessary to describe regularities of a system effectively. Rouse (2001) 
summarizes the complexity of a system (or model of a system) as related to the intentions 
with which one addresses the system, the characteristics of the representation that 
appropriately accounts for the system’s boundaries, architecture, interconnections, and 
information flows, and the multiple representations of a system. We can represent degrees 
of complexity by examining the graphs that result when we record the intentions, 
characteristics, interconnections, etc., in a given situation. 
Acquisition programs have struggled with complexities in both program management 
and engineering design (e.g., NASA’s Constellation Program [Committee on Systems 
Integration for Project Constellation, 2004] and FAA’s NextGen [NextGen Integration and 
Implementation  Office, 2009]).  While first-order impacts of decisions are nearly always 
considered, the cascading effects that result from complex interdependencies obscure the 
quantification and visibility of the higher-order impacts of developmental decisions and 
disruptions.  Furthermore, the network structure behind the collaboration can contribute both 
negatively and positively to the successful achievement of SoS capabilities and, even 
earlier, to the developmental success.  Collaboration via interdependence may increase 
capability potentials, but it also contains concealed risk in the development and acquisition 
phases. 
Our approach quantifies the impact of system interdependencies in the context of 
system development and capability. It provides a means to conduct analysis of alternatives 
while navigating the decision space that simultaneously considers the potential positive 
impacts of interdependencies (e.g., capability) as well as the negative impacts (e.g., 
development time).  The work comprises new improvements to a Computational Exploratory 
Model (CEM)—a discrete event simulation model—previously introduced in prior Acquisition 
Symposia (Mane and DeLaurentis, 2009, 2010) that aims to provide decision-makers with 
insights into the development process by propagating development risk in the SoS network. 
The impact that system risk, system interdependencies, and system characteristics have on 
the estimated completion of a program are generated. We present a proof-of-concept 
application that analyzes the development time of the Airborne Laser (ABL) system and 
conduct a trade-off study between development time and capability while considering 
various alternatives for the constituent systems of the ABL.  
Computational Exploratory Model (CEM) Overview 
The CEM is based on the 16 basic technical management and technical system-
engineering processes outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DoD, 2008a), often 
referred to as the 5000-series guide. However, an SoS environment changes the way these 
processes are applied. The Systems Engineering Guide for System-of-Systems (SoS-SE; 
DoD, 2008b) addresses these considerations by modifying some of the 16 processes in 
accord with an SoS environment.  The resulting processes and respective functions consist 
of translating inputs from relevant stakeholders into technical requirements, developing 
relationships between requirements, designing and building solutions to address 
requirements, integrating systems into a high-level system element, and performing various 
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managing and control activities to ensure that requirements are effectively met, risks are 
mitigated, and capabilities achieved. 
The CEM, centered on these revised processes, is a discrete event simulation of the 
development and acquisition process.  This process creates a hierarchy of analysis levels: 
SoS Level (L1), Requirement Level (L2), and System Level (L3).  Component elements at 
each level are a network representation of the level below.  The SoS Level (L1) is comprised 
of the numerous, possibly interdependent requirements (L2) needed to achieve a desired 
capability.  Similarly, satisfaction of each requirement in the Requirement Level (L2) requires 
a number of possibly interdependent systems (L3). 
At the Requirement Level (L2), Requirements Development contains the technical 
requirements of the SoS (provided externally). The technical requirements are then 
examined in Logical Analysis to check for interdependencies among the requirements. A 
check for inconsistencies among requirements is also performed.  Design Solution 
development and Decision Analysis are the next processes, which belong to the System 
Level (L3). They produce the optimal design solution from the set of feasible solutions to 
meet the given requirements.  The optimal design solution not only is based on the current 
set of requirements and solution alternatives but also takes into account all previous 
information available through requirements, risk, configuration, interface, and data 
management processes.  Because most acquisitions are multi-year projects involving many 
different parties, the overlap between the management processes, Design Solution and 
Decision Analysis, allows for greater tractability of decisions. It is at this stage that system 
interdependencies are identified.  The optimal design solution obtained from this phase is 
then sent to the next stage: Technology Planning and Technology Assessment. In the event 
that an optimal or sub-optimal design solution to successfully implement the given 
requirements does not exist, the feedback loop to Requirement Development translates into 
a change in the technical requirements for the SoS.  Technology Planning and Technology 
Assessment are System Level (L3) scheduling processes that oversee the implementation, 
integration, verification, and validation for all the component systems in the SoS. 
The Implementation and Integration Phases of component systems constitute the 
lowest level of detail modeled in the CEM.  The design decisions made at earlier stages 
must be implemented and integrated in these phases to generate the final product of a 
program.  Figure 1 presents an abstraction of the layered networks that result from the 
modeling of the acquisition process: systems are grouped to satisfy a requirement, and 







Figure 1. Layered Network Abstraction of Computational Exploratory Model 
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Systems can be independent, can satisfy several requirements, and can depend on 
other systems.  The CEM simulates these layered relationships to capture the impacts that 
any changes—related to decision-making, policy, or development—in any of the component 
systems, requirements, and relationships between them have on the completion of a project.  
In our prior experiments, we studied the impact of different interdependency topologies. The 
exercise of the CEM described in this paper assumes a fixed topology and instead 
specifically targets variations in inherent system risk, the interdependency strength among 
systems, and the span-of-control of the SoS authority (if present). The next section presents 
the CEM model dynamics and input parameters. 
Model Input Parameters 
The CEM operates as a discrete event simulator of the development process.  It 
models risk (probability of a disruption and associated consequence) present in the 
implementation and integration of each component system as well as the risk due to the 
system interdependencies.  Furthermore, systems and SoS engineers are often faced with 
the decision of using legacy assets to satisfy a given requirement or opt for the development 
of brand new ones.  The CEM includes parameters such as readiness-level to differentiate 
between legacy assets/platforms, new systems, and partially implemented/integrated 
systems (i.e., systems under development) and to investigate the impact that the inclusion 
of such systems in the development of an SoS has on the success of a project.  Table 1 
presents the input parameters, and the remainder of this section expands and explains their 
role in the CEM.
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Table 1. Input Parameters of Computational Exploratory Model 
Parameter Notation Description 
Requirement Level (L2) 
Requirement 
dependencies 
Dreq Adjacency matrix that indicates requirement 
interdependencies 
Risk profile Rreq Probability of disruptions in Requirement Development 
Phase  
Impact of disruptions Ireq Time penalty when disruptions hit Requirement 
Development Phase 
System Level (L3) 
System dependencies Dsys Adjacency matrix that indicates system interdependencies 
Development pace of 
design 
tdes Increase in completion of Design Solutions Phase  
Design risk profile Rdes Probability of disruptions in Design Solutions Phase 
Impact of design 
disruptions  
Ides Time penalty when disruptions hit Design Solutions Phase 
Span-of-control soc Indicator of how Implementation and Integration are 
performed (sequentially or simultaneously) 
System initial readiness-
level 
m0(i,r) Initial readiness-level of system i to satisfy requirement r (for 
Implementation Phase) 
System risk profile Rsys(i,r) Probability of disruptions (during implementation) of system i 
when satisfying requirement r 
Impact of disruptions Isys(i) Time penalty when disruptions hit system i during 
Implementation/Integration 
Implementation pace pimp(i) Increase in readiness-level at each time-step during 
implementation of system i 
Integration pace pint(i) Increase in completeness-level at each time-step during 
integration of system i 
Implementation start  limp(i,j) Readiness-level of system j when Implementation Phase of 
dependent system i begins  
Strength of dependency S(i,j) Strength of dependency of system i on system j 
The requirement dependency matrix (Dreq) indicates how the development and 
satisfaction of requirements depend on each other, which impacts the sequence in which 
requirements are developed and satisfied.  For example, if Requirement A depends on 
Requirement B, then development of Requirement A begins when Requirement B has been 
satisfied.  As requirements are developed, the risk profile (Rreq) of Requirement 
Development indicates the probability of disruptions at this stage in the development 
process. Disruptors signify a change in requirements or the addition of new requirements. 
When a requirement is changed after the acquisition process has begun, it affects all 
subsequent processes and causes a time delay (Ireq) that is added to the project time.  Every 
requirement that is implemented is fed into its own Design Solution and Decision Analysis 
process. The Design Solution and Decision Analysis processes feed into each other, and 
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the risk profile (Rdes) indicates the probability of disruptions at each time-step during the 
completion of the stage with a value between 0 and 1.  Any disruptions at this stage indicate 
that the design solution provided is not feasible and a time penalty (Ides) that indicates a re-
design of the solution is incurred.  If the solution fails in multiple consecutive time-steps, 
then the requirement is sent back to the Requirement Development stage; otherwise, the set 
of component systems and their user-defined parameters are sent to the Technical Planning 
and Technical Assessment processes, based on the development-pace parameter of this 
stage. 
The Implementation Phase simulates the development of each system.  The nature 
of candidate systems may range from legacy systems to off-the-shelf, plug-and-play 
products to custom-built, new systems.  Here, we define legacy systems as systems that 
have been developed in the past to achieve a particular requirement, and new systems as 
not-yet-developed systems envisioned to satisfy a new requirement.  When considering the 
use of legacy systems to meet a new requirement, the capability of these systems to satisfy 
the new requirement is not necessarily the same as their capability to meet the original 
requirement for which they were designed.  Additionally, the risk associated with the 
modification of a legacy system and the risk associated with the development of a brand 
new system can be quite different.  Legacy systems may, however, provide cost and/or time 
benefits if modifications are less severe than a new development, as is the case with new 
systems.  To delineate systems in a meaningful way, we describe the spectrum of a 
system’s ability to satisfy a requirement in terms of its readiness-level. 
System readiness-level, a concept proposed by Sauser et al. (2006), is a metric that 
incorporates the maturity levels of critical components and their readiness for integration 
(i.e., integration requirements of technologies).  This is an extension of the widely used 
Technology Readiness-Level (TRL), a metric that assesses the maturity level of a program’s 
technologies before system development begins (USD[AT&L], 2005).  While similar in spirit 
to the SRL metric proposed by Sauser et al. (2006), readiness-level in the present work is 
defined in a different manner and with less detail.  We define system readiness-level as the 
readiness-level of a system i to satisfy requirement r, m(i,r), with a value between 0 and 1.  
A system with a readiness-level of 1 is a fully developed system that can provide a certain 
level of capability.  The dynamic model starts the Implementation Phase of a system from its 
initial readiness-level and simulates its development/implementation until it reaches a 
readiness-level of 1.  An initial readiness-level of 0 indicates a brand new system that must 
be developed from scratch, while a system with an initial readiness-level greater than 0 
indicates a legacy system that is partially developed to satisfy a requirement r but needs 
further development to reach a readiness-level of 1.  In general, careful research of a 
candidate system i will determine its initial readiness-level to satisfy a requirement r, and, 
therefore, the amount of development necessary to achieve a readiness-level of 1.0. 
The CEM simulates the Implementation Phase as a series of time-steps in which a 
pre-determined increment of readiness (pimp(i)) is gained at each time-step of each system i 
or lost if a disruption occurs (according to the system risk profile of system i in satisfying 
requirement r, Rsys(i,r)).  This is clearly a gross simplification of the actual development 
process for a system; however, it adequately serves the purposes of the research, which is 
focused on the interdependencies between systems to develop a SoS capability and aims to 
capture the impact of disruptions on the development process.  Accurate modeling of the 
Implementation Phase would increase the accuracy of the model for a particular application, 
but it would not change the nature of the observed results. 
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Representation of Disruptions 
The risk associated with the development of a system is a function of its inherent 
characteristics (technology, funding, and complexity levels) and on risk levels of the systems 
on which it depends.  The former may be estimated via a variety of analysis techniques that 
examine a system in detail, but the latter requires knowledge of system interdependencies 
that can be numerous, complicated, and often opaque.  Developmental interdependencies 
of SoS create layered networks that often span among a hierarchy of levels (DeLaurentis et 
al., 2005; Butler et al., 2001; Ayyalasomayajula et al., 2008; Kotegawa et al., 2008).  The 
complexity of these networks often hides many of the otherwise explicit consequences of 
risk.  Depending on the network topology characteristics, disruptions to one of the critical 
nodes or links in the network can propagate through the network and result in degradation to 
seemingly distant nodes (Huang et al., 2008). 
In this study, we express inherent risk as a density function that describes the 
probability of a disruption occurring at any time during the system development.  We 
concentrate on the Implementation and Integration Phase as the development stage where 
disruptions occur.  Here, inherent risk is the probability of disruptions due to the 
development characteristics of the subject system (e. g., technology readiness-level, 
funding, politics, etc.).  Risk due to interdependencies, on the other hand, is the probability 
of disruptions during the Implementation Phase of a system due to disruption in the system 
on which the system of interest depends.  This is essentially the conditional probability of a 
disruption, given that another system has a disruption. 
This study assumes that the inherent risk of a system i in satisfying requirement r, 
Rsys(i,r), is solely a function of its readiness-level, m(i,r).  While a somewhat simplified 
definition, expressing risk as a function of a system’s readiness-level is logical since 
readiness describes the necessary development of a system to satisfy a given requirement.  
Therefore, risk changes as the readiness-level of a system increases.  Equation 1 
introduces a relationship between a system’s readiness-level and inherent risk (probability of 
disruption). 
( ) ( )( )irimriR isys βα ,1, −=           (1) 
In this relationship, αi (with a value between 0 and 1) is a parameter that indicates 
the upper-bound value of risk for system i (i.e., producing maximum probability of disruption) 
while βi is a shape parameter that indicates how quickly risk changes as a function of 
readiness-level.  This formulation implies that risk is highest at the early stages of 
development (e.g., low readiness-levels) and it decreases (at different rates, depending on 
the value of the βi parameter) as development progresses.  For instance, when a system i 
has a readiness-level of 0.0—it is a brand new system—the probability of disruptions during 
development will be highest, and it will have a value αi.  However, when the system has a 
readiness-level of 1.0, the probability of disruptions will be 0.  System inherent-risk is 
implemented in the CEM by using a uniform random distribution to select a value between 0 
and 1 at each time-step of the Implementation or Integration Phase and passing it into a 
binary channel to see if the number is smaller or greater than the probability of disruption 
defined by Rsys(i,j).  This determines if a disruption occurs or not. 
When all systems are independent, identification of the system with highest risk is 
trivial (e.g., the system that, on average, will contribute more to delays in completion time).  
However, when systems are interdependent, systems that otherwise have a low inherent 
risk can be greatly impacted by disturbances because of the transmission of risk from other 
systems.  Systems are impacted by nearest neighbors (those systems on which they directly 
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depend; first-order dependencies) and by systems that impact those nearest neighbors 
(higher-order dependencies). 
The CEM models risk due to interdependencies in terms of the dependency strength 
between two given systems.  Dependency strength, S(i,j), is an input parameter that takes 
values between 0 and 1 and is defined as the conditional probability (uniform random 
probability) that system i has a disruption, given that system j (on which system i depends) 
has a disruption.  Risk due to interdependencies is, therefore, a function of the readiness-
level of the dependent-upon system as well as the strength of that dependency. 
When considering the development of different system sets that can provide a 
desired SoS capability, the characteristics of interdependencies must be considered 
because they have a large influence on both capability and development time.  Quantifying 
the impact that such characteristics have on the development process can aid decision-
makers in selecting the most promising alternative.  The next section of this paper presents 
a proof-of-concept application of the CEM to perform an analysis of alternatives study for 
different constituent systems of a development network while comparing capability and 
development time. 
Proof-of-Concept Application 
The ABL program serves as the proof-of-concept problem for demonstrating the 
Computational Exploratory Model (CEM), equipped with a capability estimate module, for 
performance of trade-off analyses between capability and development time.  The CEM 
simulates the propagation of disruptions in the network of component system 
interdependencies and enables a trade-off study between the completion time of the ABL 
and its potential capabilities when different component system alternatives are considered. 
The ABL is a theater defensive weapon concept that is designed to destroy ballistic 
missiles in their boost phase within the first two minutes of flight from hundreds of kilometers 
away (Davey, 2000).  The current ABL, still under development, consists of an aerial 
platform (a modified Boeing 747-400), infrared sensors for detecting the missile, two solid 
state lasers for tracking the missile and measuring atmospheric disturbances, an Adaptive 
Optics System (AOS) for adjusting for atmospheric disturbances, and a Chemical Oxygen 
Iodine Laser (COIL beam) for destroying the missile.  Figure 2 presents these component 
systems and their layout in the Boeing B747-400, as described in (Defense Industry Daily, 
2009).  Note that the ABL program may not be considered a system-of-systems 
operationally, but developmentally, it has all of the traits required of an SoS, as described by 
Maier (1998).  In particular, the geographic distribution, along with managerial and 
operational independence, qualifies the development process of the ABL as a system of 
systems.  Development of the ABL team is undertaken by three companies, who operate 
and manufacture their respective pieces of the ABL across the country.  The Beam 
Control/Fire Control (BC/FC) system is designed by Lockheed Martin, the COIL beam is 
designed by Northrop Grumman, and the modifications to the aircraft and integration of 
systems are performed by Boeing.  In addition, each company has been able to, at least 









Figure 2. Airborne Laser Component Systems  
(Defense Industry Daily, 2009) 
The ABL operates as follows: first, several onboard Infrared Search and Track 
(IRST) sensors detect the heat radiated by the exhaust of the missile.  Next, a solid state 
laser (the Track Illuminator) tracks one or more missiles, determines an aim point, and 
passes the information to the main ABL computers.  The other solid state laser (the Beacon 
Illuminator) measures disturbances in the atmosphere so that they may be corrected by the 
AOS in order to accurately focus the main laser on the missile.  This sequence adjusts the 
focus of the COIL beam and, together, is known as the Beam Control/Fire Control (BC/FC) 
system.  Finally, the COIL beam—a dual line, multi-module laser—is focused onto the 
missile through a large turret on the nose of the vehicle until it compromises the structural 
integrity of the missile. 
Several assumptions and simplifications are necessary to facilitate the proof-of-
concept study.  While the requirements of the ABL are comprised of several 
components/tasks—detect, track, aim and adjust laser beam, and destroy missile—here 
they are grouped into a single requirement.  Additionally, the component systems of the ABL 
are grouped into four core systems: the aircraft system, the detection and tracking (D&T) 
system, the AOS, and the COIL beam system.  Development of these four systems and their 
integration results in the ABL capability of detecting, tracking, and destroying theater ballistic 
missiles in their boost phase. 
ABL Capability 
The capability of a system is embodied by the quality with which it performs required 
functions. The required capability of the ABL, as described by Barton et al. (2004), is to 
disable ballistic missiles in their boost phase.  Depending on the type of threat missiles, 
operating environment, and other operational variables, many metrics exist for describing 
the capability of the ABL system. In this work, we assume that the ABL capability of interest 
is its ability to disable threats from a range of 600 km.  Tests and studies of the ABL have 
shown that 600 km is a reasonable performance goal (Barton et al., 2004). Hence, the 
achievable capability level of the ABL will be measured against this baseline value of 
engagement range. 
Three functions are necessary on the ABL: detect and track the missile, engage the 
missile, and disable the missile. As previously mentioned, we assume that four constituent 
systems comprise the ABL system and perform the three functions. The contributions of 
each system to the execution of each function are presented in Figure 3. 
 =
=
















Figure 3. Assumed Capability Composition of ABL 
The capability of the ABL is, therefore, a function of the performance levels of each 
of its constituent systems (Table 2). 
Table 2. Performance Goals of ABL Systems 
Constituent System Performance Metric Performance Level (units) 
Detection & Tracking  Detection time, Td 10 (sec) 
Aircraft Payload capacity 250,000 (lbs) 
COIL beam  Beam power, P 5 (MW) 
Adaptive Optics Beam quality, bq  1.2 (n/a) 
The detection time, Td, is the time that the D&T system requires to acquire a target 
and generate a track.  This is an important performance parameter because it will dictate the 
time available to the laser to engage and disable the target during the boost phase.  Based 
on the report by Barton et al. (2004), an acceptable dwell time (the amount of time that the 
laser must deliver its energy) for a liquid-propelled missile is on the order of 4 to 5 seconds.  
This means that for a given raid size, the D&T system has a limited time to acquire the 
target and generate tracks.  We assume that in order for the ABL to disable up to 12 
simultaneously launched liquid fuel missiles (with a boost phase of 170 seconds), the ideal 
detection time is 10 seconds (based on a dwell time, te, of 4.2 seconds; Equation 2). 
      (2) 
The COIL beam is the centerpiece of the ABL system.  The beam power, P, 
determines the amount of energy that will be delivered to the missile. Again, based on the 
extensive report by Barton et al. (2004), a reasonable power performance for the COIL 
beam is around 5 MW. The capability of the ABL will be a function of this performance 
parameter as well as the performance of the other constituent systems. 
The aircraft hosts the other constituent systems of the ABL and provides the 
necessary mobility characteristics of this weapon. However, we assume that from a 
capability point of view (to disable a missile from 600 km), it can fulfill the necessary 
requirements to host the constituent systems of the ABL and is thus not a part of the 
capability trade space. Note that this is a simplifying assumption in this study but one that 
can be included in more detailed studies. 
Finally, atmospheric disturbance must be accounted for, since it plays a significant 
role on the laser performance. Development of the ABL system includes the development of 
 =
=




an advanced Adaptive Optics System that can account for the atmospheric disturbances 
and increase the energy delivered to the missile. The performance of these optics is 
typically described by the Strehl ratio. The Strehl ratio is a measure of the quality of optics 
that compares the peak intensity at the detection point with a theoretical maximum intensity.  
While various factors contributed to the quantification of the Strehl ratio, Barton et al. (2004) 
provide the simplified description: 
       (3) 
where bq is the beam quality diffraction limit and can be used as a performance benchmark 
for adaptive optics. Barton et al. (2004) state that a beam quality value of 1.2 represents a 
reasonable goal. 
The amount of energy required to disable a missile varies according to the missile 
construction and the type of fuel it utilizes (fuel tanks are the most vulnerable part of the 
missile).  Barton et al. (2004) offer a simplified relationship between the performance 
parameters of its constituent systems and the capability of the ABL to disable a missile from 
a distance R. In this relationship, the force required to disable a missile, Fc, is expressed as 
follows: 
     (4) 
where D and λ are the diameter and wavelength of the COIL beam, respectively; R is the 
slant range (e.g., the distance between the ABL and the target missile); P is the COIL beam 
power in Watts; te is the laser dwell time (e.g., the time that the laser delivers its energy to 
the target); and SR is the Strehl ratio of the Adaptive Optics System. Solving this relationship 
for the slant range, R, describes the capability of the ABL as a function of the performance 
parameters of its constituent systems.  
     (5) 
The capability contributed by the COIL beam is represented by the COIL beam 
power, P, (and fixed values of D = 1.5 m and λ = 1.315 μm ); the capability contributed by 
the AOS is represented by the SR value; and the capability contributed by the D&T system is 
represented by the available dwell time, te. We assume that the capability of the ABL will be 
measured in terms of its ability to disable a liquid-fueled ICBM, which requires a force of 32 
MJ, Fc = 32 MJ/m2 (Barton et al., 2004). The capability of the ABL will be computed by using 
this relationship for different combinations of constituent systems that can offer various 
levels of system-specific performance and will be compared to their estimated development. 
ABL Development 
The Air Force and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have been experimenting with 
the simultaneous development, testing, and integration of the component systems of the 
ABL.   Because of this, development of these systems is interdependent.  For instance, the 
aircraft developer needs the stability requirements and dimensional specifications of the 
Adaptive Optics System and the COIL beam system to determine the proper mountings and 
fuselage dimensions of the aircraft; or, development of the aircraft requires knowledge of the 
heat dissipated by the COIL beam to determine the amount of heat protection to include in 
the aircraft airframe and/or subsystems.  Depending on the performance of the COIL 
beam—i.e., its maximum power output—the adaptive optics must provide a certain level of 
performance in order to deliver the required amount of energy to the target. Similarly, 
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depending on the capability of the D&T system, the adaptive optics must be able to 
effectively compensate for the atmospheric disturbances of the detection range.   
Development of the AOS is, therefore, dependent on the development of the COIL beam 
and the D&T system. A representation of the interdependencies in this example problem 





















Figure 4. Assumed System Interdependencies in ABL Example 
While more interdependencies may be present in the development of the ABL 
systems, for the purpose of this demonstration, we assume that the topology presented in 
Figure 4 represents the development interdependencies of the ABL system and remains 
fixed during the analysis of alternatives. The goal is to present a sample utilization of the 
CEM to perform analysis of alternatives and capability and development risk trade-off. The 
CEM will utilize these interdependency characteristics and other necessary parameters to 
estimate the development time of the ABL when alternative constituent systems (e.g., 
systems with varying levels of capability) are considered. 
Results 
For the proof of concept application presented here, the desired capability is the 
ability to engage and disable missiles from a range of 600 km. This capability is a function of 
the constituent, interdependent systems. Here, we assume that the designer has the option 
to select different constituent systems to satisfy this ABL requirement.  The Boeing B747-
400 is currently being used as the aerial platform that hosts the ABL system.  The MDA  
stated in a 2007 report that an alternative to the current ABL platform is the utilization of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which can offer longer endurance and eliminate the risk 
to crew members.  Similarly, Davey (2000) reports that alternate systems to the currently 
used detection and tracking system could be considered to partially fulfill the ABL 
requirement (e.g., UAV or Space Tracking and Surveillance System [STSS]).  Additionally, 
Barton et al. (2004) indicated that the ideal performance of the Adaptive Optics System and 
the COIL beam is still questionable, and sub-optimal “solutions” will be utilized following a 








Three alternative aerial platforms and three detection and tracking systems are 
considered to fulfill the ABL requirement, while three levels of performance of the AOS and 
the COIL beam with different levels of initial readiness-level are considered.  Table 3 
presents these assumed values for alternatives for the aircraft system. 





TRL Initial Readiness-Level [mo(i,r)] 
Implementation Pace 
[pimp(i)] 
new aircraft TBD 5 0.56 0.04 
KC-135A 105,821 6 0.67 0.04 
B747-400 248,000 8 0.89 0.04 
All alternatives are assumed to have an implementation pace of 0.04; this means 
that at every time-step during the CEM simulation, the completeness-level increases by an 
increment of 0.04, until a completeness-level of 1.0 is reached. The Boeing NKC-135A is 
included here as an alternate aerial host platform because it was the primary aircraft in the 
Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL) —a precursor to today’s Airborne Laser program—during 
the 1980s (Duffner, 1997).  The purpose of this program was to perform tests and determine 
whether or not a laser mounted on an aircraft could actually shoot down an airborne target.  
The Boeing 747-400 is the aircraft that currently hosts the constituent systems of the ABL 
and has a payload capacity of 248,000 lbs (Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 2010). A GAO 
report (2002) stated that the present laser with six modules weighs 180,000 lbs and the 
laser design calls for a laser with 14 modules; while the actual power output of the laser is 
not known, we assume a linear relationship between the weight of the laser and its power 
output, and, therefore, a larger payload capacity is required for the aircraft to host the sub-
systems of the COIL beam. The new aircraft alternative is assumed to provide this required 
payload capability. 
Furthermore, because modifications are necessary to host the other component 
systems of the ABL, we assume that the KC-135A, the B747-400, and the new aircraft have 
a TRL of 6, 8, and 5, respectively. We utilize the TRL as an indicator of the risk associated 
with the development of a given system; the approach followed here normalizes the TRL 
value (by dividing by the maximum possible TRL, 9) and uses this value as the initial 
readiness-level of the system (m0). The new aircraft alternative has the lowest TRL because 
it is a brand new system; however, it does not have a TRL of 0 because we assume that 
existing technologies can be utilized to meet its requirements. 
The options to the designer for the detection and tracking system of the ABL are to 
design a brand new system or use legacy systems like the Space Tracking and Surveillance 
System (STSS) or UAVs.  Table 4 presents the alternate systems and assumed capabilities 
along with their initial readiness-levels. 











New System 10 6 0.67 0.04 
UAV 11 8 0.89 0.04 
STSS 12 9 1.00 0.04 
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One option that the MDA has considered for the early detection and targeting of 
missiles is the utilization of UAVs (Buttler, 2009).  However, because current concepts of 
operations involve the UAV accepting a cue from satellites about the threat missile, we 
assume that the detection time for such a system is of 11 seconds. Recall that detection 
time impacts the available laser dwell time (e.g., longer detection time reduces the available 
time to disable the missile during the boost phase).   Furthermore, because UAVs are 
currently used to perform reconnaissance missions, we assume that utilizing UAVs for 
detection and tracking has a TRL level of 8.  Another option for detecting and tracking the 
missile is the use of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS).  As of 2003, the 
MDA has decided to fund the design but not the production of a competitive sensor for use 
aboard the satellites (Smith, 2003).  We assume that the STSS has a TRL level of 9 and can 
achieve a detection time of 12 seconds if it is used as the detection and tracking system of 
the ABL.  Finally, we consider the development of a new system to provide the D&T 
capability for the ABL system. Based on the GAO report (2002), the D&T system under 
development has a TRL level of 6. Because this is a custom system designed specifically for 
use in the ABL system, we assume that it can achieve a detection time of 10 seconds, which 
would enable the detection of up to 12 simultaneously launched missiles before the end of 
the boost phase, assuming a 170-second boost phase and a dwell time of 4.2 seconds. 
While alternative systems for the aerial platform and the D&T system exist, the COIL 
beam and the Adaptive Optics System are new technologies for which alternatives do not 
exist. Because the level of performance of these systems is still uncertain, we assume that 
different levels of beam quality and power output for the AOS and COIL beam, respectively, 
can be achieved given the different TRL levels.  Table 5 and Table 6 present these 
assumed values. 









Alternative 1 1.2 2 0.22 0.02 
Alternative 2 1.3 3 0.33 0.02 
Alternative 3 1.4 5 0.56 0.02 











Alternative 1 3 4 0.44 0.03 
Alternative 2 4 3 0.33 0.03 
Alternative 3 5 1 0.11 0.03 
The GAO-02-631 report (2002) provides the TRLs for Alternative 1 for both the AO 
and the COIL beam systems, and assumed TRL and capability values are used for the other 
alternatives, as well as implementation paces.  The systems engineer would like to know 
which combination of constituent systems results in a (ABL) system with lowest estimated 
completion time and provides the largest capability potential.  We assume that all 
alternatives have a maximum probability of disruption of 0.2 (αi = 0.2), which decreases as 
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the completeness-level of a system increases. This implies that alternatives with a larger 
initial readiness-level will have a smaller probability of disruption than systems with a smaller 
initial readiness-level.  
In the present study, the interdependency strengths between systems are varied for 
each potential ABL architecture, based on the initial readiness-level of the candidate 
constituent system. We assume that the initial readiness-level of a given system indicates 
the interdependency strength between that system and all the systems that depend on it 
and that the interdependency strength is the complement of the initial readiness-level. For 
instance, if one of the alternatives for the COIL beam has an initial readiness-level of 0.33, 
then the strength of the dependency of the aircraft system on the COIL beam system is 0.77 
(1-0.33).  
Based on the alternative systems in Table 3, Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6, there are 
81 possible combinations of D&T, aircraft, COIL beam, and Adaptive Optics Systems that 
could satisfy the requirement of the ABL, albeit at a different capability level.  For the 
purpose of this study, these describe the design space for the analysis of alternatives.  The 
goal is to quantify the trade-off between the ABL capability (in terms of the engagement 
range) and the estimated development time. To simplify, we assume that the 
interdependencies between the systems will not change in the scenarios where the 
alternative systems are utilized (i.e., the system interdependencies presented in Figure 4 will 
be invariant). 
CEM simulates the development process and estimates the completion time of the entire 
program and uses system-specific capabilities to compute the ABL capability.  Recall that 
the initial readiness level determines the maximum risk of the initial stages of the 
development process.  The estimated completion time, therefore, reflects the impact that 
risk (both inherent and due to interdependencies) has on the completion time of the ABL 
program for the different alternative systems, their combinations, and implementation 
strategies.  Figure 5 presents the expected completion time of the ABL project, as estimated 



















































Figure 5. Tradeoff Between Expected Completion Time and Potential Capability of 
ABL 
The seven solutions called out in Figure 5 represent the seven combinations of these 
alternative systems that yield promising combinations of capability and expected completion 
time.  They are the non-dominated solutions of this trade-off study and, as such, define a 
Pareto Frontier. Essentially, by choosing any of these seven solutions, it is impossible to 
improve the expected completion time without giving up capability. Table 7 lists the systems 
that comprise each of these seven solutions, the resulting potential capability, and expected 
completion time. 
Table 7. Description of Non-Dominated Solutions 
Solution D&T System Aircraft System 
COIL Beam 








1 STSS new system Alternative-1 Alternative-3 285 152 
2 STSS new system Alternative-1 Alternative-2 307 153 
3 UAV new system Alternative-1 Alternative-2 371 157 
4 UAV new system Alternative-1 Alternative-1 402 160 
5 new system new system Alternative-1 Alternative-1 461 170 
6 new system new system Alternative-2 Alternative-1 533 185 
7 new system new system Alternative-3 Alternative-1 596 215 
As expected, developing brand new systems for the D&T and aircraft system, 
combined with high capability COIL beam and AO system alternatives, produces the 
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maximum possible capability (assuming that requirements will not change) but also the 
highest development time. Systems that provide the highest level of performance also have 
the lowest initial readiness-levels, which, in turn, means high development risk.  Conversely, 
utilizing legacy systems with a relatively high readiness-level (e.g., STSS, alternative-1 for 
the COIL beam system, and alternative-3 for the AOS) results in the shortest development 
time but also the lowest capability-level. The model results, at these extremes, are verified 
with our intuition. 
A new aircraft system is always preferred. Recall that the aircraft does not impact the 
ABL capability here but contributes to the development time.  Furthermore, for the first five 
non-dominated solutions, the COIL beam system that has the lowest capability (e.g., 3 MW 
of power output) is selected. This means that the expected development time to be incurred 
to achieve higher power output is not worth the increase in the ABL capability (for the 
assumed risk values used here). Conversely, the Adaptive Optics System selected for the 
last four solutions (4–7) is the alternative that provides the highest capability. This means 
that the expected higher development time of this system justifies the potential capability 
that it can provide to the ABL. These results align with the observations of Barton et al. 
(2004), who showed in their sensitivity studies of the ABL capabilities that improvements in 
the COIL beam power output are not as critical as the ability of the Adaptive Optics System 
to correct for the atmospheric disruptions and deliver the required energy to the target. 
Although the capability and initial readiness-level values of the candidate systems in 
this study were assumed, the trade-off study represents a very real decision-making 
situation for system engineers doing AOA in pre-milestone B portions of the acquisition 
process.  The approach could be improved by using physics-based modeling tools for 
technical capacity and initial readiness-level estimation, as well as process modeling for the 
impact of disruptions under different system implementation strategies.  The CEM enables 
this type of investigation by considering the relatively explicit inherent development risk of 
component systems as well as the implicit risk due to system interdependencies. 
Conclusions 
The development of complex systems (and SoS) is beset by risk. Risk analyses of 
individual systems can explain the threats and opportunities of systems but do not capture 
the impact that disruptions to individual systems have at the enterprise level, where multiple 
systems—explicitly or implicitly interdependent—collaborate to achieve various capabilities. 
The presence of interdependencies in layered networks of development systems often result 
in increased risk and higher order disruptions that are not always visible or predictable.  The 
network structure behind the collaboration can contribute both negatively and positively to 
the successful achievement of SoS capabilities and, even earlier, to the developmental 
success.  Collaboration via interdependence may increase capability potentials, but it also 
contains concealed risk in the development and acquisition phases.   
This paper considered the Airborne Laser system under development by the Missile 
Defense Agency to present the CEM, its parameters, and example trade-off studies 
between estimated completion time of the program and its potential capability.  Results of 
the analysis of this simplified system revealed that a Pareto Frontier exists when the 
completion time of a project is compared to the potential capability that it can provide.  In 
this example, only seven of the 81 combinations of alternative systems for the aircraft and 
detection and tracking systems were non-dominated solutions.  The highest capability (and 
highest completion time) was achieved when all component systems were developed from 
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scratch and, conversely, the lowest capability (and lowest completion time) was a result of 
utilizing mature legacy systems that require minimal modifications. 
The Computational Exploratory Model presented here is an ongoing research effort 
that aims to provide a framework for the aggregation of the system-specific risk to the 
enterprise level. The extensions to the model presented here via a proof-of-concept 
application point to the ability of such a framework to quantitatively perform analysis of 
alternatives and enable knowledge-based acquisition. It is our goal to improve/facilitate the 
decision-making process of systems engineers and system integration by providing the 
means to model risk in the system development process and quantify the cascading effect 
of risk for families of systems, or SoS, as well as enable quantitative analysis of alternatives. 
Analytical models in pursuit of the same goals are also under development; one version of 
an analytical approach was presented at the 2010 Annual Symposium. 
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